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Can Artificial Intelligence Explain 
Natural Intelligence?* 
A Discussion on an Actual Problem 
MADJID MASHOUR 
This paper includes a number of viewpoints regarding the extent to which existing general-
purpose computers can be applied to simulate human mental processes (intelligence). It is main-
tained that due to fundamental structural differences between the brain and a computer, such as 
the non-binary firing of the neurons — the latter must be regarded as essentially a tool for in-
creasing human mental and/or physical efficiency rather than for explaining natural intelligence. 
Furthermore, it is advocated that the brain is basically a pattern recognizing apparatus for which 
the metric characteristics of natural or symbolic patterns are not essential and consequently new 
mathematical techniques are probably required for modeling the non-metric regularities of the 
brain functions. Data are presented concerning the incapability of man in processing numerical 
information as well as some aspects of pattern recognition as a reduction process. 
EXPLANATION BY ANALOGY 
The ultimate objective of cybernetics has recently been described as being "to 
construct intelligent machines and explain the mechanism of life" (Boulanger [3]), 
and it has been predicted that in the future such machines may even overtake human 
intelligence. One interpretation of these statements is that a day will probably come 
when advancements, particularly in synthetic techniques, will make the construction 
of living cells and components possible. This is, to the present author, a conceivable 
method by which (if realized) the mental aspects of human life, namely the underlying 
mechanism of intelligence — the higher functions of the brain — can be discovered 
and explained. On the other hand, the attribution of the psychological terms such as 
intelligence, learning, problem-solving to the functions of the existing computing 
tools — general-purpose computers — may well be considered as explanation by ana-
logy rather than scientific explanation of the brain functions. The reason is that a pre-
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sent day computer and a brain are fundamentally different both in function (to the 
extent that it is known) and in structure. The whole system of analogy is built on the 
assumption that the neurons emit signals on an all-or-none basis, thus, making the 
brain into a complicated switching system similar to an adding machine — a com-
puter — which works on the basis of binary numbers. This is, however, an over-
simplification of the nature of the neuronal signals as will be clarified later in this 
paper. What the brain is not suitable for, is the operation of adding in general and of 
adding in terms of binary digits in particular. Whereas, what the brain is really apt at 
doing is matching of patterns, in other words, the brain is basically a pattern recog-
nizing mechanism which is operating in the recognition of both the natural patterns — 
which are essential for the organism's survival — and the symbolic patterns which are 
used in thinking and semantic information processing. 
THE EFFICIENCY OF TOOLS 
Minsky [13] mentions a computer program that can play tournament quality chess 
under regular competition clock conditions with the skill of a medium amateur, and 
another program developed by Moses that can solve various textbook integration 
problems. Evans [4] has developed a program for analogical reasoning about geo-
metric figures. A number of these problems have been taken from college-level 
intelligence tests. These are only a few examples of what general purpose computer 
programs can accomplish but they indicate that machines can do things which 
"require intelligence if done by men". As we know, these performances are realized 
by sequences of operations based upon binary numbers. As any other tool these 
machines, which are in no way similar to a living brain, can in the long run, improve 
the human physical and/or mental efficiency. Tools, however, be they manual (e.g. 
a bicycle), semiautomatic (e.g. a car, an aeroplane), or fully automatic (e.g. a refinery, 
a computer) are, as we know, all superior to man regarding their efficiency. A desk 
counter, for instance, — which, as far as counting is concerned, may also be called an 
intelligent machine — carries out arithmetical operations much faster than even the 
famous "lightning calculator", J. M. F. Dase, who could maximally calculate the 
product of two 8-digit numbers in 54 seconds (see [2]). A modern digital computer 
is incomparably superior to man in memory capacity and endurance, speed of recall, 
solving a number of algebraic equations, etc. In speaking of tools the importance of 
man's control over them should be regarded as a prerequisite in order for them to 
function. In manual and semiautomatic systems this control is exerted directly by the 
participation of the human operator as the decision link in the overall man-machine 
system and thereby the system becomes a closed one. In a fully automatic machine 
on the other hand, although the system is closed without man's participation, never-
theless man's control is exterted in a most stringent form, although indirectly. For 
example in the case of a computer, this control is realized partly by the internal 
(structural) program and partly by the actual program for the specific task. Thus, the 
computer's action is directed and decided upon by man (via his program). Even the 
operation of "random search" is in effect, under man's control. Therefore, to say 
that computers seek goals and set goals is nothing but the use of mere metaphores. 
How then, can such a system bs used to explain the mechanism of an opsn self-
organizing goal-directed system like the human organism? 
THE PROBLEM OF QUANTIFICATION IN BEHAVIORAL MODELS 
Psychology — as the study of human behavior — is sometimes criticized for not 
having quantitative models for the explanation of the human mind (intelligent 
behavior). One of the critics is the Soviet cybernetician N. M. Amosov ([1], p. XI) 
who maintains that psychology and psychiatry " . . . are at that stage of development 
where, for the time being at least, they cannot offer material for modeling. The fact 
of the matter is that a necessary condition for the creation of any model is computa-
tion, that is quantitative regularity. Up to the present time, these sciences have 
almost exclusively been governed by qualitative concepts. They describe their systems 
by words, by simple graphs, and only very rarely by numbers (and this only in very 
special cases)." 
These statements are only partially true, sines as the literature testifies, psychology 
applies quantitative methods in some areas and it is also particularly abundant with 
statistically oriented theories. But most of these theories, not being able to resists the 
experimental facts, have crumbled soon after their formulation. This failure speaks 
in support of Minsky's view to the effect that adequate theoretical mathematical 
techniques for very intricate structures which show intelligent behavior, are still not 
available. Numerous experiments have shown that in contrast with computers, the 
brain is indeed a poor quantifier implying that it does not lend itself to be treated by 
conventional mathematical techniques. Let us clarify this point. 
(1) The range of the physical intensity when the intensity is transformed into 
impulses in the nerve fibres shrinks considerably, that is, the frequency of impulses 
is roughly proportional to the logarithm of the intensity. This significant reduction 
of the physical information implies that the brain is not sensitive to the finer grada-
tions of intensity which are so basic in the creation and transmission of information 
to the brain. Note that the impulses are discrete, implying that the transformation of 
the values in the two continua is not one-to-one. 
(2) That the brain is not capable of quantification — i.e. measurement as used in 
physics - has been repeatedly shown by psychophysical scaling methods. When 
human subjects are instructed to compare physical magnitudes in various continua 
and to estimate them by assigning numbers to these magnitudes, ths scales producsd 
in this way do not meet the requirements of the interval and ratio scales that are 
commonly used in physical measurements (Guilford [6], Mashour [9], Mashour 
and Hosman [10] among others). 
What the subject can do is to judge that one magnitude is "greater than", 425 
"equal to" or "less than" another one. Moreover, such numerical estimates (even if 
taken at their face values) are not equally accurate, the errors are smallest when two 
magnitudes are equal. Fig. 1 shows the plot of the relative errors against the numerical 
estimates of noise intensities (loudnesses) and time durations obtained from 20 
subjects. This is only one example from among a great deal of similar results. 
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Fig, 1 . The plot of the relative errors against the estimates of noise (left graph) and time (right 
graph) obtained from 20 subjects. The white noise (a band of 20—50.000 cps) was used as stimuli 
at 11 different sound pressure levels ranging from 0.22 to 1.50 microbars. The pressure level 1.28 
(standard 9) served as the comparison stimulus. The time stimuli were also 11 ranging from 0.3 to 
5 sec. The comparison stimulus was 3.5 sec (standard 9). The relative error was determined by the 
ratio of the stadard deviation to the geometric mean of the group estimates. 
(3) The failure of the brain in processing metric information which is the fundament 
of quantification and modeling by the conventional mathematical techniques is still 
more evident by the rich body of results on the so called "absolute judgment" of 
unidimensional stimuli according to which human being are incapable of recognizing 
more than about 5 to 9 stimuli when these vary only along a single physical dimension. 
By varying wavelength, for instance, one can identify 9 colors, by varying the frequen-
cy of a sound only 6 pitches, and so on. This limited capacity has been called "the 
magical number seven plus or minus two" (Miller [12]) and is almost independent of 
the amount of practice. In contrast, identification improves remarkably if stimuli 
vary in two dimensions or multidimentionally (Fitts and Posner [5]). And it should 
be noted that multidimensionality is the essence of a pattern's organization where the 
absolute metric values of the single dimensions lose their significance to a considerable 
extent, whilst comparative (relational) judgments play a dominant role. For example, 
426 you can identify a word irrespective of its style, letter type, size, etc. In order to do so, 
it is sufficient to have only a minimum of relational constancy between a few essential 
features (parts). 
It is therefore reasonable to conclude and emphasize that the raw material or 
elements used in higher through processes in the brain — or intelligence — are essen-
tially nonmetric patterns which might be called qualities. These are either complicated 
patterns of objects in the environment or simplified abstract patterns, that is, symbols 
and words. Consequently the mathematics which might be developed in the future 
should be of such a nature as to be appropriate to treat qualities. 
The non-metric characteristics of the brain functions are also apparent in the orien-
tation of the organism in the environment. The organism does not measure (on an 
interval or ratio level) the distance and direction relative to a goal, because it can 
always correct its errors by feedback information. Some of the problems related to 
the human pattern recognition will be dealt with in the following section. 
PATTERN RECOGNITION AS A REDUCTION PROCESS 
Pattern recognition may be considered to be a process in which the reduction of 
information is essential. This is especially the case regarding natural patterns, namely, 
those patterns which arise from the environmental sources, objects and events. This 
problem can best be illustrated in connection with the visual system. At the retinal 
level, the incident light acts on about 2 x 108 rods and 6.5 x 106 cones. Thus, the 
number of patterns which can be produced by these receptors will be even larger than 
astronomically large. In order to get an idea about how large this figure might be we 
can only mention that a matrix consisting only of 100 x 100 elements can create 
IQ3OOO p a t t e r n s The n r s t reduction of information, however, occurs through the con-
vergence of the receptors on almost 106 optic nerve fibres. The rate of information 
arriving at these fibres has on the basis of the all-or-none firing activity of the ganglion 
cells been estimated to be approximately 3.4 x 106/sec (Jacobson [8]). 
This amount should correspond to what is seen of the visual field rather than to the 
recongition of specific patterns of objects. (Seeing the visual field is an instantaneous 
process — a parallel processing — while pattern recognition is a sequential process.) 
In pattern recognition the mechanism of attention (priority processing, amplification) 
is usually involved. Moreover, the more specific (the more detailed) a pattern the 
more learning that is required to recognize a pattern as a specific one. There is in 
principle no difference between learning to recognize a word or an object. Only very 
elementary patterns such as simple geometric figues may be excepted. 
The sequential character of pattern recognition was verified by an experiment in 
which very simple pictures of familiar objects, words, letters, and geometric figures 
(such as those in Fig. 2) were presented simultaneously in a homogeneous dim back-
ground under various time periods (Mashour [11]). Fig. 3 shows the typical increase 
in the number of patterns both recognized and seen as functions of presentation time 
(left graph) which supports the assumption of sequential processing in pattern 
recognition. Note that the number of patterns either recognized or seen never reaches 
the total number of patterns presented. 
Fig. 2. A sample of simple geometric 
figures projected simultaneously on a 
screen under various presentation times 
ranging from 0.125 to 5 sec. 
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Fig. 3. The number of patterns seen and recognized by 20 subjects as a function of presentation 
time (left graph) and pattern size (right graph). Each point represents the group average. 
The difference between the number of patterns presented and the number of 
patterns seen indicates that the visual system is subject to a kind of partial blindness 
which runs counter to the view that all information is present in the short-term 
memory. The rate of pattern recognition determined at this experiment was about 
5 - 8 patterns/sec depending mainly on the pattern type (and size) which clearly 
confirms the substantial reduction of information flow from the periphery (receptors) 
to the central mechanism. Hunt [7] has, on some other context, provided an interest-
ing discussion concerning the reduction process in human information processing. 
The technique of pattern recognition by intelligent machines has advanced possibly 
farther than any other branch of artificial intelligence so that some types of pattern 
recognizers such as character recognizers are at the present time in common use. 
A review of the attempts made for the construction of pattern recognizing machines 
is to be found in [14]. One may wonder how, while our knowledge of natural pattern 
recognition.is almost entirely blocked already at the retinal level, one is able to 
construct devices that might recognize patterns in the same way that living beings do. 
To differentiate letters by some technical mechanism does not necessarily imply that 
the mechanism explains human letter recognition, just as a thermometer which 
discriminates degrees of temperature offers no. explanation of the underlying me-
chanism of human sensitivity to and discrimination of temperature. 
Fig. 4. A simple closed curve 




An interesting version of artificial recognition technique which belongs to the 
artificial intelligence domain is one which was designed by Evans [4] as part of his 
program for the solution of a class of geometric analogy intelligence test questions. 
In his program a simple closed curve (SCC) as for example the pattern show in Fig. 4 
is described by coordinates (x, y) of the points (A, B, C, D) the straightness of the 
lines (AC, CD, DB) being taken as 0 and the degree of curvature of curve AB as 1 in 
this case. Thus the programmed description of the pattern (Fig. 4) is written as 
(SCC((0-3, 03) 0-0 (0-7, 0-3) 0-0 (0-7, 0-6) 
1-0(0-3, 0-6)0-0(0-3, 03))) 
Using such programs, the computer can process the digital information fed into it 
and thereby discriminate each individual pattern; then, by following an advanced 
program it can make correct analogies between geometric figures. As can be under-
stood from the descriptive program, artificial intelligence works with numbers as 
features of a pattern rather than the features themselves. In the case of natural in-
telligence on the other hand, all information about the relevant features and their 
mutual relations should be fed into, say, the human computer so that a pattern 
similar to the original natural one can be reconstructed (recognized). Evans' program 
ultimately results in a series of binary digits instead of a pattern. Even so, a full 
numerical representation of the pattern in Fig. 4 in terms of (x, y) instead of only 
4 points, would require a much longer program and thereby the waste of the com-
puter's memory as a consequence. 
THE PROBLEM OF ALL-OR-NONE FIRING 
Now, let us disregard all the structural and functional differences which exist 
between a computer and the brain and confine ourselves to an examination of the 
main assumed similarity between them which is thought to justify the simulation of 
the brain functions by general-purpose computers; namely, the neurons'action in an 
all-or-none manner. It is a well-established fact that a neuron (a ganglion cell, for 
instance) either fires or does not fire which, in this respect alone, it may be considered 
similar to the computers binary units. But, when it fires it sends not one but a series 
of impulses to the next cell or cells. The frequency of impulses produced by a firing 
depends on the intensity of the stimulus which affects the corresponding recsptor(s). 
This means, therefore, that in contrast to a neutral single impulse (firing) in a com-
puter which magnetizes a magnetic core in one of 2 different ways (i.e. 0 or 1), a neu-
ronal firing conveys, in addition, specific information about the intensity of the 
stimulus. On this basis, the correct description of the all-or-none firing of a cell 
would be that either a cell does not fire or it fires in one of many ways (i.e. 0 or n, n 
being a variable whose value depends on the frequency of impulses produced by 
a firing), and consequently the binary number character of the cell function and with 
it the similarity (which has almost been taken for granted) between the computer and 
the brain will, most probably, lose its validity. Therefore, it is hard to believe that 
artificial intelligence of the present structure might explain natural intelligence. 
However, this important field of research — the techniques of artificial intelligence — 
will certainly bring about still greater achievements in increasing human mental 
efficiency. 
(Received March 30, 1972.) 
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